Differences

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--- netmdocm [2011/01/16 14:34] – nopsled
+++ netmdocm [2024/05/21 14:32] – nopsled
@@ Line 210: / Line 210: @@
-There is a 40-byte header (MACLIST\0, followed by 4 DWORDs with unknown meaning, followed by (DWORD)2, followed by the number of operations done on the maclist (in this case 3), followed by the number of MACs (here: 0), followed by 0 (unknown field).  Then come the 8-byte macs, but in this case there are none.  Then follow extensions, which have this structure: a DWORD with the type of the extension, and a DWORD with the length (excluding this 8 byte extension header).  In this case, there is only an extension of type 0 which contains 0x18 bytes.  The extension 0 maps ekb device/leaf IDs to status codes in a yet to be determined manner, in this case: 0x00000002 -> 1, 0x00010001 -> 3, 0x00010002 -> 1.
+There is a 40-byte header (MACLIST\0, followed by 16 bytes of the  SalOmgID (omg_id.dat), followed by (DWORD)2, followed by the number of operations done on the maclist (in this case 3), followed by the number of MACs (here: 0), followed by 0 (unknown field).  Then come the 8-byte macs, but in this case there are none.  Then follow extensions, which have this structure: a DWORD with the type of the extension, and a DWORD with the length (excluding this 8 byte extension header).  In this case, there is only an extension of type 0 which contains 0x18 bytes.  The extension 0 maps ekb device/leaf IDs to status codes in a yet to be determined manner, in this case: 0x00000002 -> 1, 0x00010001 -> 3, 0x00010002 -> 1.
 ===== maclist2.dat =====
@@ Line 937: / Line 937: @@
 In other words, this extracts the 0-extension of a MACLIST and an encrypted hash of that.
+See pcmaclist(6)
 /*
@@ Line 1085: / Line 1087: @@
 ===== querycif(09) - Get KEK encrypted content key =====
-/*
-Procedure prototype:
- querycif(09)
-Input:
-SalPointer const &,
-SalPointer const &,
-long,
-long,
-SalPointer const &,
-SalOmgId const &,
-SalPointer const &,
-long,
-SalExtrinsicsProg const &,
-Output:
-SalAsnSeqBegin,
-long &,
-OmgString &
-querycif(09)
-Process File, SalOmgId, param3, long (3), long (3), Ekb capability table, 00010001_EKB -> Enc(CKEY, KEK)
-*/
-unsigned char param3[24] =
-{
-x46, 0x73, 0xE4, 0x89, 0x6A, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0x96, 0x69, 0x43, 0xAA, 0x39, 0x99, 0xE2, 0x08, 0xC4,
-xF8, 0xCA, 0x19, 0x2E, 0x38, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0x4C,
-} ;
-unsigned char param6_EkbCapabilityTable[24] =
-{
-x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-} ;
-/* Return value. TODO: double check */
-unsigned char return_value[11] =
-{
-x30, 0x80, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x08, 0x82, 0x19, 0x23, 0xFD,
-} ;
 <code>
@@ Line 1185: / Line 1139: @@
-function GetKekEncCKEY(blob_t OpfImage (arg_2), blob_t EkbCapTableBody (arg_3))
-{
-	Array ProcessFile[5];
-	dict[4] = EkbCapTableBody;
-	ProcessFile = decode_asn1(opf_image);
-	dict[3] = OpfImage;
-	//
-	// Calculate HMAC for the opf[3] usage information. Check if it matches with the HMAC value in opf[1]
-        //
-        // ProcessFile[1]:  HMAC(opf[3], saldec(opf[2]))
-	blob_t dec_pf2 = devicesal_220_decrypt_hook_249(ProcessFile[2],  EkbCapTableBody);
-	blob_t serialized_opf3 = BCSerialize(ProcessFile[3]);
-	blob_t key = concat ( dec_pf2, serialized_opf3 );
-	blob_t hasked_key = inline::SHA-1 ( key, 0);
-	blob_t key_pf2 = concat ( dec_pf2, hashed_key );
-	blob_t hashed_key_pf2 = inline:SHA-1 (key_pf2);
-        // if( HMAC(opf[3], saldec(opf[2]) == ProcessFile[1])
-        //
-        //
-	if (compare_blob (hashed_key_pf2, ProcessFile[1])  == 0)	// 0xffff
-									// Test_Small_Int_For_Zero -> 0 (acc)
-	{
-		... todo
-	}
-}
 </code>